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STATUTES-TELECOMMUNICATIONS-FROM CALEA
TO CARNIVORE: HOW UNCLE SAM CONSCRIPTED
PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN ORDER TO WIRETAP
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
I. FACTS
In 1984, the federal government broke up AT&T.1 Technological com-
petition within the telecommunications industry was furious following the
breakup.2 Between 1984 and 1994 telecommunications technology, es-
pecially digital telecommunications technology, 3 advanced at unprece-
dented rates and law enforcement had not kept pace.4 Congress wanted to
ensure law enforcement had the technological ability to conduct telephonic
surveillance; to that end, Congress conscripted the assistance of the tele-
communications industry. 5 In the waning days of its 103d session, Con-
gress enacted legislation mandating that private industry create and employ
technologies to assist law enforcement in monitoring and capturing digital
telecommunication information. 6 That legislation was the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA).7 CALEA required
the telecommunication carriers to assist law enforcement in obtaining the
content of digital telephone calls and information that may identify a call,
such as a telephone number. 8
Congress wanted uniform and efficient implementation of the legisla-
tion and therefore asked the telecommunications industry, rather than the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to draft the administrative
1. Lillian R. BeVier, Symposium Tribute to William F. Baxter, The Communication As-
sistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break up of AT&T, 51
STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1050 (1999).
2. Id.
3. Digital telecommunications include wired telephony technologies such as fiber optics and
computerized switching, mobile telephony technologies such as cellular and digital PCS (personal
communication services), as well as the Internet and e-mail. In this case comment both cellular
and digital PCS technologies are referred to with the umbrella terms "cellular" or "mobile"
telephones.
4. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1050-51.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
6. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1051. President Clinton signed the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) into law on October 25, 1994. Id. (citing Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 & 47 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999))).
7. Id.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
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implementation standards. 9 From 1995 until 1997, the Telecommunications
Industry Association (TIA), which had assumed leadership for the tele-
communications industry, consulted with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) to determine the CALEA implementation standards.10 In the
spring of 1997, the TIA asked telecommunication carriers and law enforce-
ment agencies (LEAs) to vote on a proposed cellular and digital personal
communications services (PCS) and wireline compliance standard."] The
LEAs rejected the standard.12
In part, the LEAs voted against the plan because the FBI wanted nine
capabilities beyond what the TIA offered.13 The most controversial of the
nine was the ability to capture the digits dialed after a call is connected.14
This capability is called "post-cut-through digits" or "dialed digit extrac-
tion." 15 Beyond dialed digit extraction, the FBI wanted to know when a
person joins or leaves a conference call and when the person uses call for-
warding or call waiting.16 The FBI asked for access to electronic signals
indicating a telephone is ringing, is busy, or has a waiting call or message.17
The FBI wanted to monitor the content of conference calls and have access
to system timing records in order to match monitored call content to the
system's various electronic signals.18 Further, the FBI wanted the telecom-
munication carriers to verify that an established wiretap is functioning.19
Telecommunication carriers were asked to inform law enforcement when a
tapped telephone was in use and to indicate when a tapped customer was
9. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(1) (1994).
10. Michael A. Rosow, Note, Is Big Brother Listening? A Critical Analysis of New Rules
Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies to Use Dialed Digit Extraction, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1051,
1063 (2000).
11. See In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking (Further Notice), 134, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,690 (1998) (stating J-Standard
applies only to wireline, cellular and PCS carriers); Id. 12 at 22,640 (noting that the balloting
occurred in the spring of 1997).
12. Id. 12 at 22,640.
13. See Rosow, supra note 10, at 1063. Other LEAs wanted capabilities beyond those nine
requested by the FBI; for example, the New York City Police Department wanted to use radio
direction finding to determine the location in space where a cellular signal is originating. In re
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order (Third Report), IT
43 & 46, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,815-16 (1999).
14. Third Report, 112 at 16,842. An example is the digits representing a bank account
number, dialed after first connecting to the telephone number of a bank. Id. T 119 at 16,844.
15. Id. T 112 at 16,842.
16. Id. T 68 & 76 at 16,825, 16,828.
17. Id. 83 at 16,830.
18. Id. 58 & 90 at 16,821, 16,833.
19. Id. T 97 at 16,836.
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adding or deleting calling features such as call waiting. 20 These nine capa-
bilities are collectively known as "custom calling features."
2 1
Congress had not required law enforcement participation in the ballot-
ing process; therefore, the telecommunication industry re-balloted without
law enforcement participation and unanimously adopted the TIA proposal.22
In December of 1997, the TIA published the adopted standards under the
title, "Interim Standard/Trial Use Standard J-STD-025" (J-Standard).23
However, even without the custom calling features, the J-Standard con-
tained provisions that proved controversial to groups interested in digital
privacy.24
For example, under the J-Standard, the telecommunications industry
was to provide law enforcement the location of the cellular antenna used at
the beginning and end of a targeted telephone call.2 5 This provision was a
compromise between the telecommunications industry and law enforce-
ment.26 Originally, law enforcement wanted the ability to track mobile
telephones as they moved from cell site to cell site.27 The New York City
Police Department wanted to determine the precise physical location of the
caller by plotting the direction from which cellular signals arrived at multi-
ple antennas.28 On the other hand, SBC Communications, Inc. wanted to
provide only the location of the "landline central office" through which the
cellular calls were routed.2 9 Negotiations led to compromise, and the tele-
communications industry agreed to provide the location of the antennas
used at the beginning and end of a marked call. 30 There was also agreement
that court authorization was required to access location information.3 1
20. Id. 102 & 107 at 16,838, 16,840.
21. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,463 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
22. Further Notice, 1114-15, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,642 (1998).
23. Id. 14.
24. Third Report, 13, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,802 (1999); see also In re Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Public Notice (Public Notice), 13 F.C.C.R. 13,786 (1998)
(articulating Center for Democracy and Technology's argument that it cannot reasonably comply
with the interim standard, and its request that the FCC delay implementing the Act indefinitely).
25. Third Report, TI44, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,815.
26. Further Notice, 50, 13 F.C.C.R. at 22,656-57.
27. Id.
28. Third Report, 43 & 46, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,815-16. This process is known as
triangulation or, alternatively, as radio direction finding. Id.
29. Further Notice, 50, 13 F.C.C.R. at 22,656-57. SBC Communications is affiliated with
Southwestern Bell Telephone. Id. at 22,708 (separate statement of Commissioner Harold W.
Furchtgott-Roth).
30. Third Report, [44, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,815.
31. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,458,464 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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The J-Standard also provided "packet-mode" data to law enforce-
ment.32 Data packets are a technology new to the digital age.33 With older
communication systems, a single dedicated circuit opened between the call-
ers.34 Instead of delivering data in a continuous stream within a single cir-
cuit, digital technology breaks data into small bits and sends those bits
through multiple circuits via numerous routes.35 These packets re-assemble
in sequence at the ultimate destination. 36 Because the data is broken down
and re-assembled, each packet has addressing and sequencing information
in addition to the data.37 Often it is difficult to fully separate the addressing
and sequencing data from the data forming the message.38 US West and
others objected that limiting law enforcement access to either the addressing
information or the content was not currently possible because complete
separation of the data is not possible.3 9 The FBI disagreed and argued that
such separation is technologically feasible. 40
The FCC received three petitions for review of the J-Standard in the
spring of 1998.41 The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) asked
the FCC to reject the antenna location information and packet-mode data
portions of the J-Standard.42 The CDT alleged that packet-mode data pro-
vided law enforcement with more capability than Congress envisioned by
allowing law enforcement access to call content in situations where a court
has approved access only to call identification information.4 3 In another
petition for review, the FBI and the Department of Justice argued that the J-
Standard should include further assistance requirements and capabilities.44
The FBI asked the FCC to add the nine surveillance capabilities for which






38. Id. The FCC invited further study of packet-mode data because of the risk that content
could be obtained when law enforcement was only authorized to collect call-identification infor-
mation. Further Notice, 1$ 64-66, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,662-63 (1998). This constitutes a
privacy concern because it would enable law enforcement to access private personal information,
such as a bank account number, when it was only authorized to secure telephone numbers. Id.
39. Third Report, 53, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,818 (1999). The FCC outlined the US West
objection as follows, "separating the header from content in packet-mode communications is not
feasible because packet data is delivered in a layered stack structure, and carriers have neither the
ability nor any business reason to monitor packet data streams and then decipher the various
protocols." Id.
40. Id.T54at 16,818.
41. Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. 13,786 (1998).
42. Id.
43. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
44. Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 13,786.
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the FBI previously asked the TIA.45 In response to the CDT and FBI peti-
tions, the TIA asked for a determination whether the J-Standard was either
under-inclusive, as argued by the FBI, or over-inclusive, as asserted by the
CDT.46
The CDT offered three separate arguments attacking the location in-
formation requirement.4 7 First, location information would turn mobile
phones into tracking devices.48 Transforming private property into govern-
ment surveillance devices, the CDT asserted, violated CALEA provisions
that law enforcement was to have no more surveillance capabilities with
digital technologies than the law tolerated with "plain old telephone ser-
vice" (POTS).49 The CDT pointed to CALEA language stating that the
physical location of the marked telephone was not to be obtained via a "pen
register" or "trap and trace device" as call identifying information except to
the extent that the location could be known generally from the telephone
number.50 This would be a static and broad area such as a city within an
area code.51 In contrast, the antenna location information would demon-
strate movement of the telephone and implicitly of the caller.52 The FCC
responded that even with POTS, law enforcement could know the exact lo-
cation of a tapped telephone by using emergency services databases or tele-
phone company records. 53 Therefore, knowing that a caller is within range
of a particular cellular tower would actually provide less specific location
information than that obtainable with POTS.54
Second, the CDT argued that CALEA's "origin" and "destination"
terminology could not support location information as both terms have
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 48-66.
48. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 455.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 458 (quoting section 103(a)(2) of CALEA, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)
(1994)). "[Clall-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the
physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from
the telephone number)." 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2). A "pen register" is a record of outgoing
telephone numbers dialed from a particular telephone. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994). A "trap and
trace device [is] a device ... which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number" of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic
communication was transmitted. Id § 3127(4).
51. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 458.
52. Id.
53. Third Report, 39, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,813 (1999). US West commented that while
the exact physical location of a wired telephone can be obtained from its number, that information
is "incidental and should not be read as an underlying mandate of CALEA." Id. 1 41, 14 F.C.C.R.
at 16,814.
54. Id. $ 39, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,813.
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"obvious meanings apart from location." 55 Presumably, the CDT believed
that origin "obviously" meant the telephone number of the caller and
destination "obviously" meant the telephone number called. 56 Interpreting
the terms to mean a cellular antenna site as well as the "obvious meanings"
violated the canon of statutory construction that each word of a statute has a
single and unique meaning.57 The FCC responded that CALEA defined
call-identification information as both "dialing" and "signaling"
information. 58  According to the FCC, CALEA's description of call-
identification information as "dialing" information meant that things like
telephone numbers were call-identification information. 59  Further,
according to the FCC, CALEA also defined call-identification information
as "signaling" information, which included the signals between the antenna
and the telephone.6O Therefore, call-identification information, according to
the FCC, included both telephone numbers and antenna location
information.61
Finally, the CDT argued that, since a mobile phone is usually used by
the subscriber, location information is more "personally revealing" than
similar wireline information would be. 62 That is, the owner is the
individual using the cellular telephone in almost every instance. 63  In
contrast, numerous persons often use wired telephones. 64 Since a higher
volume of use offers some anonymity, a public telephone, where anyone
enters information, is a stark contrast to cellular telephones, in which
information was likely entered by the owner of the telephone.65 Therefore,
55. Id. The relevant text from CALEA states, "the term 'call-identifying information' means
dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of
each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or
service of a telecommunication carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1994).
56. Third Report, T 39, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,813. The J-Standard defined "origin" and "destina-
tion" as the telephone number of the caller and recipient respectively. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227
F.3d at 459.
57. Third Report, 39, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,813. Canons of construction are like Newtonian
physics in that for every canon there is an equal and opposite canon. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1949-1950). Here the FCC offset the "unique
meaning" canon with a canon stating that statutory language cannot be reduced to "mere
surplusage." Third Report., 44, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,815 & n.95. The FCC reasoned that if the
terms "origin" and "destination" had meaning only in the context of "dialing" information, the
term "signaling" information would be reduced to "mere surplusage." Id.










monitoring a cellular telephone reveals more about the caller than
monitoring a wired telephone because there is no anonymity. 66
The CDT also attacked the J-Standard's inclusion of packet-mode
data.67 According to the CDT, the data separation difficulties with packet-
mode data would necessarily allow law enforcement access to call content
even when it had satisfied only the lesser legal standards for obtaining call
identifying information via a pen register or a trap and trace device. 68 The
FCC took note that packet-mode data implicated privacy concerns because
of the data separation difficulties. 69 The FCC, however, decided that the is-
sue was not ripe for decision because further study of the technology was
needed.70 The FCC asked the telecommunications industry to study the
problem and find a solution; however, the FCC tentatively let the require-
ment stand. 71
After rejecting the CDT petition regarding antenna location and packet-
mode data, the FCC adopted four of the custom calling features requested
by the FBI.72 These included the capability to capture digits after a call is
connected, or "post-cut-through dialed digit extraction." 73 A second capa-
bility provided signals indicating that a party to a conference call is on hold,
joining the conversation or hanging up.74 The third item provided elec-
tronic signals indicating the subject is forwarding calls to another telephone
or switching to a waiting call. 75 The fourth item notified law enforcement
when the marked telephone received a network message, such as a tele-
phone ring, busy signal, call waiting indication, or a message.76 Given an
adverse FCC decision, Petitioners sought judicial review. 7
7
66. Id.
67. Further Notice, j 59, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,660 (1998).
68. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2000). There are differing
legal standards for different kinds of wiretaps. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2) & (3) (1994) (ob-
taining call content requires law enforcement to show probable cause of a serious crime, as
defined by the statute and to obtain a judicial warrant) with 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (1994) (ob-
taining records of incoming and outgoing telephone numbers requires only a certification by law
enforcement that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation").
69. Third Report, 55-56, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,819-20 (1999).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 456. The FCC adopted four capabilities in whole, two
in part, and rejected three. Id. Only the four provisions adopted in whole were later challenged by
the Petitioners. Id.
73. Third Report, i 112 & 123 at 16,842, 16,846.
74. Id. IN 68, 74-75 at 16,825, 17,827-28.
75. Id. I 76 & 82 at 16,828, 16,829-30.
76. Id. IN 83 & 89 at 16,832-33.
77. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 456-57. Petitioners included: The United States Tele-
com Association, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, the Center for
2001]
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Petitioners argued generally that the FCC exceeded its statutory autho-
rity and ignored CALEA's privacy and funding requirements.78 The FBI
and the Department of Justice filed a brief in support of the FCC decision.
79
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FCC
implementation order regarding cellular tower locations and packet-mode
data was proper, but that the order regarding inclusion of the custom calling
features was improper. 80
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Telephone wiretaps are a form of eavesdropping, which has long been
a tort.81 Today, wiretaps constitute a search and seizure of communica-
tions.82 Moreover, wiretaps may constitute an indiscriminate dragnet,
catching innocent third persons in the search.83 Therefore, telephone wire-
taps implicate the Fourth Amendment, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 84
Several Supreme Court cases have interpreted what wiretaps are
"reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 85 Additionally,
Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Id. The following groups petitioned for a
removal of the dialed digit extraction capability: the Telecommunications Industry Association,
the Personal Communications Industry Association, Sprint PCS, and U.S. West. Id. at 457.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 463-65.
81. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967). At common law, the eavesdropper stood
under the eaves of a house in order to listen to the conversation inside. Id.
82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
83. Berger, 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Thus in [United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867 (D. D.C. 1950), rev'd 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 195 1)] wiretaps of the defendant's home and office telephones recorded con-
versations between the defendant and her mother, a quarrel between a husband and wife
who had no connection with the case, and conferences between the defendant and her
attorney concerning the preparation of briefs, testimony of government witnesses,
selection of jurors and trial strategy.
Id.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
85. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding a wiretap did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when there was no entry onto the defendant's property); Katz, 389
U.S. 347, 353-54 (determining that a trespass standard for Fourth Amendment protection is too
[VOL. 77:795
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Congress has enacted communication statutes that affect the permissible
scope, method, and means of wiretaps. 86
A. WIRETAP LAW IN THE EARLY YEARS, 1876-1934
Although the telephone was patented in 1876, there was little regu-
lation of the medium, especially on a federal level, until into the 1930s. 87
Despite the extensive use of the telegraph in the nineteenth century, no
dedicated federal agency existed to regulate communications carriers until
1934.88 It was not until 1928 that the Supreme Court considered whether
the Fourth Amendment protects telephonic communication. 89
In Olmstead v. United States,90 the United States Supreme Court first
decided whether a wiretap is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment.91 It ruled that wiretaps did not constitute either a search or a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. 92 In Olmstead, federal agents tapped the
copper telephone lines outside the office of Olmstead who, the agents
suspected, was violating prohibition laws.93 The agents never entered Olm-
stead's office nor did the agents seize any tangible thing from Olmstead. 94
narrow); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-56 (1979) (finding no Fourth Amendment
protections exist for telephonic data willingly provided to third parties).
86. See, e.g. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Title III to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 & 47 U.S.C.).
87. Pub. L. No. 75-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) On the other hand, the states were relatively active in providing statutory protection
against electronic eavesdropping. See infra note 93; see also Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-46. For
example, California made interception of telegraph, and later telephone, communications illegal as
early as 1862. Id.
88. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
151 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
89. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
90. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
91. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
92. Id. at 466.
93. Id. at 455-56. Wiretapping was a misdemeanor under applicable Washington State law.
Id. at 466. To that end, Chief Justice Taft stated, for the Court, "[a] standard which would forbid
the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials
would make society suffer and give the criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore." Id. at 468. In response, Justice Holmes rendered an oft-quoted remark, "I think it is a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that Government should play an ignoble part [in
illegal activity]." Id. at 470. Washington State was not alone; in 1928, twenty-five states, in-
cluding North Dakota and South Dakota, made wiretapping a criminal offense. Id. at 479 & n. 13
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and thirty-two other states
prohibited telecommunication carriers from assisting law enforcement in a wiretap. Id.
94. Id. at 457, 466.
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The Court determined that without a physical intrusion there could be no
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's "houses, papers and
effects" language. 95
There was no search because the Olmstead Court read into the Fourth
Amendment a "physical invasion" standard.96 That is, to constitute a search
there must first be some invasion, or trespass, upon the property of the
complainant. 97 The only property the agents in Olmstead ever physically
touched was that of the telephone company, not that of the complainant. 98
Since there was no intrusion, there was no search.99 Hence, the Court con-
cluded, the mere recording of the electronic signals constituting Olmstead's
voice from copper wires lying outside his property was not a search because
there was no entry onto his property.' 00
The Olmstead Court next determined whether there had been a Fourth
Amendment seizure.1 01 Consistent with its search analysis, the Court de-
termined that since the electronic data was not tangible, it was not capable
of Fourth Amendment seizure.102 Electronic data was not, strictly con-
strued, a "house," "paper," or "effect" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.103 Nothing about the electrons that constituted Olmstead's
telephonic messages was tangible, and therefore the messages were not "ef-
fects."104 Therefore, the electronic capture of Olmstead's voice did not
constitute a seizure within the Court's understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. 105
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis warned of a danger in strictly constru-
ing the language of a 1791 amendment when applying its principles to
technological searches and seizures in 1928.106 To Justice Brandeis, the
Court's requirement that something be tangible to receive Fourth Amend-
ment protection was too narrow.107 Evolving technology threatened to
95. Id. at 457 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
96. Id. at 456.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 457.
99. Id. at 456.
100. Id. at 466.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional is
enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into




increase the sting of government surveillance unless constitutional interpre-
tation kept pace because technology was transforming once tangible things,
like communications, into mere patterns of electrons.108 While the social
function of communication had not changed, the Court afforded communi-
cations less protection because of an accident of technology.109 Justice
Brandeis found no comfort in the fact that such surveillance was used for
the purportedly benign purpose of catching criminals because, to Justice
Brandeis, the wiretap was a tool of tyranny, 10
B. WIRETAP LAW FOR A DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY, 1934-1984
In 1934, Congress reacted to Olmstead with the Communications
Act.lI In addition to creating the FCC, the Communications Act made sur-
veillance without consent of the caller a violation of federal law. 1 2 The
108. Id. at 474.
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.
... The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.
Id. at 473-74. Some commentators have noted the similarity of this prediction to Internet and
e-mail surveillance technologies, where state or private actors can, theoretically, enter and copy a
wired hard drive under the cloak of secrecy and without any physical intrusion. JEFFREY ROSEN,
THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 38-39, 59 (2000); see also
Hearing on the Carnivore Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age,
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member).
The means by which law enforcement authorities may gain access to a person's
private effects is no longer limited by physical proximity, as it was in the time of the
Framers. New communications methods and surveillance devices have dramatically
expanded the opportunities for surreptitious law enforcement access to private
messages and records from remote locations.
Id.
109. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
110. Id. at 479.
[I]t is also immaterial that the intrusion was in the aid of law enforcement. Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Id. "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments
of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping." Id. at 476.
111. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.) (providing the first federal privacy protections for telephonic communications); see
also Berger v. New York, 338 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (noting the belief that the Communications Act
was a response to Olmstead).
112. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 & 605 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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Communications Act, therefore, offered electronic communication statutory
protection against surveillance despite Olmstead's denial of similar consti-
tutional protections.11 3 Therefore, electronic surveillance was constitution-
ally permissible but illegal under federal statutes.114 Two subsequent
Supreme Court decisions found a middle ground in which law enforcement
could collect telephonic recordings via a wiretap, although the Communica-
tions Act excluded the recorded information from use as evidence at trial." 5
Subsequent changes in the law, constitutional and statutory, would end the
uneasy state of affairs created by the juxtaposition of Olmstead and the
Communications Act. 116
1. Evolving Constitutional Standards
The Supreme Court returned to the wiretap issue twice in 1967.117
First, the Court considered Berger v. United States.1 8 The issue was
whether a New York statute allowing telephonic wiretaps when there was
"reasonable ground" to believe evidence of a crime could be obtained was
permissible under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. 19 Justice Clark, writing for the Court, concluded that the
statute allowed invasions into a "constitutionally protected area." 120 Fur-
ther, since the New York statute only required a "reasonable ground," it did
not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.121 Thus,
the statute resembled an impermissible general warrant. 122 The Court found
the New York statute unconstitutional for lack of a particularity require-
113. Compare Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 with 47 U.S.C. § 605.
114. Compare Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 with 47 U.S.C. § 605.
115. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1065-66 (citing Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382
(1937)); see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 117-148.
117. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 43 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349
(1967).
118. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
119. Berger, 388 U.S. at43 n.1.
120. Id. at 43. Justice Clark referred to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
(considering the scope of the exclusionary rule) to support his assertion that wiretapping is Fourth
Amendment activity because the Fourth Amendment "protect[s] against the overhearing of verbal
statements." Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 55-56.
122. Id. at 58. The Court stated:
New York's broadside authorization rather than being "carefully circumscribed" so as to
prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy actually permits general searches by
electronic devices, the truly offensive character of which was first condemned in Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 [(1765)], and which were then known as "general




ment; however, it fell to the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas to sug-
gest that Olmstead was therefore overruled and that wiretapping constituted
a Fourth Amendment activity.1
23
Whether electronic eavesdropping was, in fact, Fourth Amendment ac-
tivity was at issue in Katz v. United States.124 In Katz, federal agents had
attached a concealed microphone to the outside of a public telephone booth
that they suspected Katz would use. 125 He did, and the federal agents used
the recorded communication to arrest Katz.126 The issue was whether the
secret recording violated Katz's Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy. 127
The Court found that law enforcement had violated the Fourth Amend-
ment by bugging the public telephone line used by Katz.' 28 Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provides a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" to individuals. 29 Harlan then outlined
the now controlling test for implicating the Fourth Amendment: whether an
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in a particular action and
whether society is willing to accept that expectation as reasonable. 3 0 Since
Katz took steps to ensure his privacy, such as shutting the door to the booth,
he subjectively expected privacy.131 Furthermore, Harlan reasoned that
Katz's expectation was objectively reasonable because people expect pri-
vacy when they shut a door to the world.132 Since Katz had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment applied.133 Therefore, the
federal agents should have obtained a warrant before placing the
microphone on the booth.13
4
Justice Stewart, writing for the Katz Court, referred to the Olmstead
decision as entertaining a "narrow view" of the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.135 The Court commented, "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
123. Id. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 349.
128. Id. at 348, 359.
129. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id.




135. Id. at 353.
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area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."136 Hence,
the Court abandoned Olmstead insofar as it required a trespass before state
action constituted a search. 37 Further, the Court overturned Olmstead's
protection against a seizure of only tangible things.138 The Court found that
the Fourth Amendment protects not only tangible things, but also the "re-
cording of oral statements." 139 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment permits
telephonic searches and seizures only if law enforcement first obtains a
judicial warrant based upon probable cause. 140
2. Congressional Reaction
Congress codified the Katz warrant requirement in Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).141 Any tele-
phonic information that is call content, as opposed to call-identifying infor-
mation, is subject to the Title III warrant requirement.142 Title III sets out
several requirements that had to be satisfied before a magistrate issued a
wiretap warrant. 143 For example, every application for a warrant must be in
136. Id. at 351. However, searches of "open fields," do not implicate Fourth Amendment
protections. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984). "Open fields" is a term of art as it
refers to anything outside the curtilage of a dwelling and thus need not be either "open" nor a
"field." Id. at 180 & n. 11. The Court reasoned that real property is not an "effect" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and even if it were, there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy outside protected curtilage. Id. at 176, 178-79. The Oliver dissent pointed out that the
actions of Katz in the telephone booth were outside any kind of protected curtilage yet protected
by a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 185. Nevertheless, despite this apparent contra-
diction the Court made no effort to overrule Katz. Id. Hence both Katz and Oliver stand as good
law although their co-existence can, at times, be uneasy. Id.
137. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
138. Id. at 353.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 356.
141. Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (Title III), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994)).
142. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) reads in part:
Each application ... shall be made in writing.... Each application shall include:
a. the identity of the.., officer making the application;
b. a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the
applicant .... a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities
from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, . . . a
particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted ...
the identity of the person ... whose communications are to be intercepted;
c. a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed;
d. a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be
maintained;




writing and affirmed by oath.144 The application must contain the identity
of the investigating officer.145 The application must list all facts and cir-
cumstances justifying the need for a wiretap and all the less evasive meas-
ures that have been tried and have failed, and why less evasive measures
will likely not work in the future.146 Finally, the applicant must identify
when and for how long the wiretap will be in place as well as identifying
any previous wiretap applications.147 The combined effect of Katz and Title
III is to extend Fourth Amendment protection to telephonic communication
and amend the Communications Act to allow unauthorized wiretapping
given a warrant.
148
3. Continued Evolution of Legal Standards
Title III protections were broad and outlawed all forms of telephonic
eavesdropping not otherwise authorized in the legislation.149 However, in
Smith v. MarylandSO the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of protected
electronic data.151 The Fourth Amendment does not protect pen registers.
52
Smith relied on the reasonable expectation of privacy test first found in Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence in Katz.153 There is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in something willingly given to another.154 The Court determined
that since the pen register was a recording of information willingly provided
to third parties, namely telecommunication carriers, there was no expecta-
tion of privacy that society was prepared to accept as reasonable.155 With-
out a reasonable expectation of privacy there is no search within the
f. where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting






148. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (extending Fourth Amend-
ment protection to records of telephonic communications) with 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (allowing
unauthorized electronic monitoring of telephonic communication given a warrant).
149. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1068. It has been argued that Title III wiretapping protections
have eroded. ROSEN, supra note 108, at 37. Wiretaps were originally allowed only for crimes
involving violence or national security (e.g., treason and espionage). Id. However, by 1996,
seventy-one percent of all wiretaps involved drug cases. Id.
150. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
151. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (regarding pen registers).
152. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994) (defining pen register).
153. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (citing Katz, 329 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
154. Id. (citing Katz, 329 U.S. at 351).
155. Id. at 742.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment.156 A warrant is not, therefore, required
to obtain pen registers. 157
In 1986, Congress extended limited statutory protection to pen registers
in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).158 To monitor pen
registers and trap and trace devices under ECPA, law enforcement must
merely certify that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation."159 This limited protection has led some to
criticize the ECPA as insufficient.160 According to Senator Patrick Leahy,
the law currently requires federal judges to automatically grant prosecutor
requests for pen registers or trap and trace orders.'61 While limited, the
ECPA protection for pen registers is a step beyond Smith, which denied pen
registers as well as trap and trace devices Fourth Amendment protections. 162
The guiding principles of telecommunications law going into the digi-
tal era were these: (1) Katz and Title III require a warrant in order to collect
call content via a wiretap; and (2) while Smith denied pen registers Fourth
Amendment protection, the ECPA requires that a law enforcement official
seeking pen register information certify that the information is relevant to
an ongoing investigation.163 The protection afforded to pen registers as
well as trap and trace devices is limited. 164 The next challenge would be to
apply these principles to the rapidly developing technologies of the digital
era. 165
C. WIRETAP LAW IN THE DIGITAL ERA, 1984-2001
While federal constitutional and statutory law limited law enforce-
ment's ability to monitor digital telecommunications, the technology itself
came to act as a barrier to government surveillance. 66 The replacement of
copper telephone lines with fiber optics, the introduction of computerized
switching, as well as the plethora of new communication technologies de-
veloped after the 1984 breakup of AT&T stood as barriers to law enforce-
156. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
157. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (1994).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (1994). Trap and trace devices are records of incoming
telephone numbers; for example, caller-id is a trap and trace device. Id. § 3127(4).
160. Leahy, supra note 108. Leahy describes the limited judicial protection as a mere
"rubber stamp." Id.
161. Id.
162. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3122 with Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 148 and 159.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 166-92.
166. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1050.
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ment's wiretapping efforts.16 7 Law enforcement agencies argued that they
needed the telecommunications industry's assistance to preserve law
enforcement's ability to conduct electronic surveillance. 68 In response, the
103d Congress passed CALEA.169
CALEA mandates that the telecommunications industry make its digi-
tal systems technologically capable of assisting law enforcement intercep-
tion and monitoring of individual telephone calls as well as obtaining call-
identifying information.170 Call-identification information is defined as
"dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, desti-
nation, or termination of each communication generated or received by a
subscriber by means of any equipment, facility or service of a telecommu-
nications carrier."'1 CALEA requires that call-identification information
be "reasonably available" to the telecommunications carrier before being
included in implementation standards.172  "Reasonably available"
information is defined as that which is present at a carrier's "intercept
access point" (IAP).173
Congress intended that CALEA preserve the status quo regarding sur-
veillance capabilities.174 In other words, law enforcement should not have
access to more personal information due to an accident of technology.175
The information available to law enforcement from CALEA affected tech-
167. Further Notice, 3, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,635 (1998); see also Rosow, supra note 10,
at 1058; BeVier, supra note 1, at 1050. According to BeVier:
The break up of the AT&T... in 1984 unleashed a burst of technological progress
and entrepreneurial activity in telecommunications. These developments, in tandem
with the pace of progress in the computer industry and the remarkably swift emer-
gence of the Internet as a mainstream tool of commerce, information dissemination,
and all manner of human conversation, have triggered a communications revolution
whose scope and magnitude could not possibly have been foreseen.
Id.
168. Hildegard A. Senseney, Note, Interpreting the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice Department Verses the Telecommunications Industry and
Privacy Advocates, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 665, 668 (1998).
169. BeVier, supra note 1, at 1051. The first attempts at a surveillance of digital telephony
bill were included in a 1991 anti-terrorism bill, sponsored by Senator Joseph Biden; the matter
never made it to the Senate floor. Id. at 1071. After some efforts by the elder Bush Admini-
stration, the issue was handed off to the Clinton Administration. Id. Clinton-appointed FBI
Director, Louis Freeh, finally mustered enough political influence to push a digital telephony bill
(CALEA) through the Congress. Id. at 1075.
170. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 1002(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
171. Id. § 1001(2).
172. Id. § 1002(a)(2).
173. Third Report, 28, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,808 (1999). The IAP is the systemic point
at which data is obtained by the telecommunication carrier. Id. 14, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,803. The
IAP is analogous to a water faucet where the faucet is the systemic point in a pipeline where water
can be removed from the system and examined. Id.
174. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 22 (1994).
175. Id.
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nologies is to be roughly equivalent to that obtained from traditional tele-
phonic surveillance technologies. 176
Congress directed the telecommunications industry to define what tech-
nologies would be necessary for implementing CALEA in order to promote
uniform and efficient implementation.177 Under CALEA, the telecommuni-
cations industry is to consult with law enforcement agencies, regulators,
and consumers regarding implementation standards.178 Although consulted,
law enforcement agencies and personnel are not to dictate the specific
design of communications equipment, services or features.179 If other
persons or agencies believe the industry standards are "deficient," they may
petition the FCC for review. 180
The FCC is only to change the industry standards after identifying a de-
ficiency.181 In identifying a deficiency, CALEA requires the FCC to con-
sider five factors.182 First, the implementation rules are to "meet the assis-
tance capability requirements ... by cost-effective methods."183 Second,
the rules must "protect the privacy and security of communications not
authorized to be intercepted."' 84 Third, the FCC should minimize the cost
of implementation passed onto residential ratepayers.185 Fourth, implemen-
tation standards must recognize that the public policy of the United States
favors encouraging development and dissemination of new technologies
and services to the public.186 Finally, the implementation rules should
provide telecommunications carriers with a reasonable amount of time for
transition. 187
Congress included a safe harbor provision for telecommunications
equipment in use before January 1, 1995.188 A telecommunications carrier
may petition the FCC for a compliance analysis if the carrier believes it is
not reasonable to make the carrier's pre-1995 equipment compliant.189 If
176. Id.
177. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(b)(1) & 1006 (a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
178. Id. § 1006(a)(1).
179. Id. § 1002(b)(1).
180. Id. § 1006(b).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 1006(b)(1).
184. Id. § 1006(b)(2).
185. Id. § 1006(b)(3). The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimated that
compliance cost for the core J-Standard would reach as high as $4 billion. Third Report, 20, 14
F.C.C.R 16,794, 16,805 (1999).
186. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(4).
187. Id. § 1006(b)(5).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (1994); see also Third Report, 33, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,810.
189. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(l).
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the FCC then finds that compliance is not reasonably achievable, the tele-
communications carrier may ask the Attorney General to provide federal
funding for the reasonable costs of compliance. 90 Whether or not the At-
torney General allocates funds for an upgrade, the telecommunications car-
rier is considered CALEA compliant.191 The federal government is to
reimburse telecommunication carriers for equipment installed after January
1, 1995 for CALEA purposes. 192
III. ANALYSIS
The court in U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC193 determined that CALEA
did not support the addition of the custom calling capabilities desired by the
FBI.'94 However, the court retained the antenna location and packet-mode
data features that were originally included in the J-Standard.195 Much of the
U.S. Telecom opinion concerns the application of administrative law; that
is, whether the FCC acted properly by reviewing the J-Standard when and
as it did.196 Underlying the administrative law matters, however, were
concerns about privacy.1 97 Congress directed the FCC and the telecom-
munications industry to consider privacy issues when implementing
CALEA.198 However, privacy is a broad and ambiguous term which is not
defined in CALEA, and therefore the court needed to conceptualize what
Congress meant by "privacy" in the context of each challenged
capability. '99
190. Id. § 1008(b)(2)(A). This money would be pulled from a congressional allocation for
implementation expenses of $500 million for fiscal years 1995-1998. 47 U.S.C. § 1009 (1994).
191. Id. § 1008(d).
192. Third Report, 26, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,807-08. This reimbursement is left to the
discretion of the Attorney General. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(a).
193. 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
194. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 463. Judges Tatel, Ginsburg, and Randolph of the
District of Columbia Circuit heard the U.S. Telecom case; Judge Tatel wrote the opinion. Id. at
453. The court heard the petitions of the CDT as well as the FBI; these petitions followed an FCC
rulemaking. Id. at 455-57.
195. Id. at 464-65.
196. Id. at 457-60. Because the definition of call-identifying information was ambiguous,
the court relied on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. at
457. Chevron established a two-part test for interpreting agency interpretations of a statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. A court must determine whether Congress has spoken directly to
the issue at hand, and if not, the agency interpretation must be based on a permissible construction
of the language. Id.
197. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 459 (discussing the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy requirement).
198. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(2) (1994).
199. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 463 (concerning the privacy implications of dialed
digit extraction and whether retaining antenna location information was reasonable given privacy
concerns) and at 464-65 (noting that packet-mode data has privacy implications that may.have to
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A. PACKET-MODE DATA
Whether packet-mode data would allow law enforcement greater ac-
cess to information than tolerated by a particular warrant or pen register or-
der was an issue in U.S. Telecom. 20 0 The court determined that the FCC
decision to include packet-mode data in CALEA implementation standards
was permissible.2 01 Although the FCC recognized packet-mode data could
provide too much private information to law enforcement, the FCC retained
the capability. 202 The FCC did not turn a blind eye to the privacy problem;
to deal with privacy concerns, the FCC requested that the telecommunica-
tions industry formulate a technological solution to the data separation
problem. 203 In so doing, the FCC noted that its decision to implement the
packet-mode requirement was merely an "interim" requirement. 204 The
court sidestepped the issue of what legal standard is required to access data
packets by stating that telecommunications carriers need not turn over the
data unless law enforcement have "proper" legal authorization.05
The court did not decide what constitutes "proper" legal authoriza-
tion.2 06 Therefore, it remains unclear as to whether "proper" authorization
means a wiretap warrant, a pen register subpoena, or something in the mid-
dle.207 The court believed that it did not need to decide the issue because it
was not squarely before the court and changing technology could act to
make the problem moot. 208 Hence, the court skirted Fourth Amendment
analysis by admitting to possible privacy concerns but remanding the
be re-visited). The primary source for defining "privacy" is the reasonable expectation of privacy
test from Katz. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).






CALEA authorizes neither the Commission nor the telecommunications industry to
modify either the evidentiary standards or procedural safeguards for securing legal
authorization to obtain packets from which call content has not been stripped, nor may
the Commission require carriers to provide the government with information that is
"not authorized to be intercepted."
Id.
206. Id.
207. Hearings on H.R. 5018, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, H.R. 4987,
Digital Privacy Act of 2000, and H.R. 4908, Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testi-
mony of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel for the Center of Democracy and Technology).
208. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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problem back to the telecommunications industry for a technological
solution. 209
B. ANTENNA LOCATION INFORMATION
Another issue was whether to retain antenna location information, as
defined in the J-Standard.210 The court emphasized that including antenna
location information merely maintained a surveillance capability similar to
that used in POTS.211 Since the antenna is the medium through which the
electronic message travels, it is the digital equivalent of copper wire.212
Therefore, knowing the antenna location is like knowing the path or, at
least, the general location of a tapped copper telephone wire. 213
In retaining the antenna location requirement, the court faced the issue
of whether call-identification information was limited to telephone num-
bers. 214 The FCC had answered this question in the negative by pointing to
CALEA language defining call-identifying information as both "dialing"
and "signaling" information where "signaling" information referred to the
radio communication between the cellular telephone and the antenna. 215 In
analyzing the same issue, the court relied on Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel.2 16 Chevron tested agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory language.217 According to the court, CALEA could
have simply stated that call-identification information meant only telephone
numbers if Congress had so intended. 218 Further, Congress did define call-
209. Id.
210. Id. at 462; see also Third Report, 144, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,815 (1999).
211. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 462.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 463-64. In response to this holding the Executive Director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Marc Rotenberg, stated, "[i]t is generally not the case that the law
both provides law enforcement the right to conduct a search and also requires technical steps be
taken prior to the issuance of a warrant to ensure that success in the search be assured." Hearings
on H.R. 5018, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, H.R. 4987, Digital Privacy Act of
2000, and H.R. 4908, Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marc
Rotenberg, Executive Director Electronic Privacy Information Center).
214. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 457.
215. Third Report, 144, 14 F.C.C.R. at 16,815.
216. 467 U.S. 837.
217. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
218. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 458. For this analysis the court relied on Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). Russello states that "[wihere Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."
Russello, 464 U.S. at 23. Since Congress used the term "telephone number" elsewhere in CALEA
but not in defining call-identifying information, the court assumed Congress intended the disparate
exclusion. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 458. Therefore, Congress must have meant call-
identifying information to mean more than telephone numbers. Id.
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identifying information as both dialing and signaling information, and
therefore the definition should not be read narrowly as including only
dialing information such as telephone numbers.219 Hence, the court found
that the FCC could interpret CALEA as including antenna location
information under the Chevron standard.220
Finally, the court considered whether the antenna location requirement
respected privacy concerns.22 1 The J-Standard required more than a pen
register order before law enforcement could access the information.2 22 The
Fourth Amendment does not protect a pen register because it is a record of
information willingly provided to third parties.2 23 However, location in-
formation is different; often it is not willingly provided to third parties and
therefore more than a mere pen register is needed to access it.224
C. CUSTOM CALLING FEATURES
The court also determined whether the FCC erred in injecting custom
calling features into the J-Standard.225 The court found FCC inclusion of
custom calling features to be an impermissible and arbitrary agency
action.226 For example, the FCC exceeded the bounds of the CALEA lan-
guage by including the custom calling features.22 7 To justify inclusion of
the features, the FCC interpreted some CALEA provisions as having multi-
ple definitions. 28 Namely, the FCC stated that the "origin" of a call meant
not only the telephone number of an incoming call but also a call waiting
tone, signals that a party was entering a conference call, and the release of a
call from hold.229 According to the court, the FCC never explained how
219. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 458.
220. Id. The FCC was obligated to give effect to every portion of the statute according to the
court. Id. at 463. Such is the rule of statutory construction from Washington Market Co. v.
Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879). Id. at 462 (citing Washington Market, 101 U.S. at 115-16).
221. Id. at 464.
222. Third Report, 44, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,815 (1999). How much more is not yet
clear. Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 464 (making no comment on what the standard should
be). However, even the Department of Justice agrees that more than a pen register is necessary;
the Department said, "[a] pen register order does not by itself provide law enforcement with
authority to obtain location information, and we have never contended otherwise." Id.
223. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
224. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 464.
225. Id. at 460-63. The four custom calling features at issue were: dialed digit extraction,
party hold/drop/join information, call forwarding and waiting information, and network
messaging. Id. at 457.
226. Id. at 461 (referring to the excessive increased cost of including the capabilities that was
not justified by the FCC).
227. Id. at 460.
228. Id.
229. Id. Additionally, the FCC used the term "termination" to mean the number of an
outgoing call as well as signals indicating a call has been switched, held, or dropped. Id.
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CALEA required these various interpretations of the language. 230 Without
such an explanation, the court could not determine if the decision was the
result of a reasoned decisionmaking process.
231
The court was also concerned that the FCC failed to explain why any
change of the industry's J-Standard was necessary. 232 CALEA required the
FCC to make specific findings of deficiencies in the industry plan before
the FCC could change it.233 However, the FCC never noted any deficien-
cies in the J-Standard.234 Additionally, the FCC failed to take proper notice
of the increased cost of compliance when it added the FBI capabilities.
235
This was in contradiction to the CALEA mandate that the financial impact
on industry and ratepayers be reasonable and minimal.2
36
However, the primary concern about the custom calling capabilities
was the effect dialed digit extraction would have on the privacy of informa-
tion not subject to the search. 237 Post-cut-through dialed digits can repre-
sent both call content and call identifying information. 238 For example, the
230. Id.
231. Id. In holding that the failure to explain amounted to a lack of reasoned decision-
making, the court relied on Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983). The specific issue in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. was whether the Secretary of Transportation
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking passive restraint requirement from the motor vehicle
safety standards. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 33. The Court required that there be a
"rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 158 (1962)). Further, the agency must "explain
why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner." Id. at 48. Only then will the choice be
considered "the product of reasoned decisionmaking." Id. at 57.
232. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
233. 47 U.S.C. § 1006 (1994). "Were we to allow the Commission to modify the J-Standard
without first identifying its deficiencies, we would weaken the major role Congress obviously ex-
pected industry to play in formulating CALEA standards." U.S. Telecom Ass 'n, 227 F.3d at 461.
234. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 460-61.
235. Id.
236. Id. The FCC knew compliance for the core J-Standard could reach $4 billion. Id.
Despite this knowledge, the FCC included the four custom calling features, which increased
compliance costs by forty-five percent. Id. The FCC never explained how adding to the already
high costs of compliance was reasonable under CALEA. Id. To this the court responded that
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. required the FCC to articulate an explanation for the action. Id. The
explanation was to include "a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."
Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43). Here the FCC never explained itself. Id.
237. Id. at 462.
238. Id. The court acknowledged that dialed digits can be either call identifying information
or content. Id. The court provided the following examples:
Some post-cut-through dialed digits are telephone numbers, such as when a subject
places a calling card, credit card, or collect call by first dialing a long-distance carrier
access number and then, after the initial call is "cut through," dialing the telephone
number of the destination party. Post-cut-through dialed digits can also represent call
content. For example, subjects calling automated banking services enter account num-
bers. When calling voicemail systems, they enter passwords. When calling pagers,
they dial digits that convey actual messages. And when calling pharmacies to renew
prescriptions, they enter prescription numbers.
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digits are content when representing data such as a bank account number.239
However, dialed digits are call identification information when representing
a second telephone number.240 Because dialed digits may constitute call
content, a caller has a reasonable expectation of privacy in them.
241
Since there is a privacy expectation in dialed digits, it might be argued
that a Title III warrant is required for access because call content might be
accessed.242 However, the FCC asserted that dialed digits are obtainable
with only a pen register. 243 According to the court, the FCC was obligated
to explain how obtaining dialed digits with a pen register would comply
with CALEA's privacy concerns. 244 Despite the need for such analysis, the
FCC merely spoke of law enforcement's need for dialed digit informa-
tion.245 The court found that the utility of the capability is no substitute for
a reasoned explanation as to why the information should be obtained with
only the limited pen register protections. 2
46
Further, the court noted, the FCC summarily rejected several alterna-
tive measures that would have addressed privacy concerns.247 For example,
the Personal Communications Industry Association recommended requiring
a Title III warrant before extracting dialed digits.248 Because these alterna-
tives placed further burdens on law enforcement, the FCC rejected them.
249
At oral argument, counsel for the FCC stated, "we addressed ourselves to
the privacy questions with a little bit of hand wringing and worrying."
250
The court responded, "[n]either hand wringing nor worrying can substitute
for reasoned decisionmaking." 251 The FCC could not simply ignore the
privacy implications inherent in a technological capability that can access





241. Cf. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977) (stating that the
Title IIl warrant requirement extends to the interception of any "contents" of a communication).
242. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000). "No court has yet
considered that contention [that dialed digits may be obtained with a pen register] however, and it
may be that a Title III warrant is required to receive all post-cut-through digits." Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(2) (1994).
245. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 462.
246. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
247. Third Report, 120, 14 F.C.C.R. 16,794, 16,845 (1999).
248. Id.
249. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F 3d. at 462.





In sum, the opinion denied the FBI requested custom calling capabili-
ties, including dialed digit extraction, but retained the antenna location and
packet-mode data provisions from the J-Standard.253 Further, the court left
open the possibility of returning to the packet-mode data issue in the future,
as industry solutions are developed. 254
IV. IMPACT
As a result of the decision in U.S. Telecom, many privacy questions
will develop. 255 However, the effect of denying the FBI the capability to
extract dialed digits is a major victory for privacy advocates because it
assumes there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed digits that are
call content. 256 Another effect of this decision will be its impact on future
lawmaking. 257 For example, the 106th Congress considered several reforms
of federal communications law regarding cellular telephone location
information. 258 In part, these reforms seek to fill the blanks left by CALEA,
namely, the legal standard required to obtain location information from
cellular communications. 259
A third effect of U.S. Telecom will be its impact on developing digital
technologies. 260 For example, U.S. Telecom requires communications car-
riers to make packet-mode data available to federal law enforcement. 261
Therefore, a precedent is set whereby industry may be required to assemble
and make sense of digital messages for law enforcement. 262 This precedent
is meaningful given that the Internet uses data packets to transmit infor-
mation. 263 In the near future, there will be a debate as to whether Internet
data-packets should be made available to LEAs, and this debate will need to
consider the fact that, while technologically similar, Internet and telephonic
253. Id. at 463-65.
254. Id. at 465.
255. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
256. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,462-63 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 271-76. Between 1997 and 1999 Congress debated
over 100 privacy focused bills and state governments looked at over 1000 measures. Toby Lester,
The Reinvention of Privacy, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 2001, at 38.
258. H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4987, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 5018, 106th
Cong. (2000).
259. Dempsey, supra note 207.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 277-90.
261. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 465.
262. Id.
263. See Senseney, supra note 168, at 665 (stating that data packets are used on the Internet);
see also Further Notice, T 63, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,632, 22,661-62 (1998) (emphasizing that CALEA is
to affect only telephony data packets and not those used for information services).
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data-packets may carry with them starkly different expectations of
privacy. 264
A. NATIONAL IMPACT
The court denied law enforcement the dialed digit extraction capability
and stole headlines in August of 2000.265 By concentrating on privacy con-
cerns, the court gave voice to a rising discontent within the American
populace. 266 As technology has advanced during the twentieth century, the
United States has become a less private place. 267 More and more Ameri-
cans are concerned that "Big Brother" truly is watching. 268 This concern
adversely affects a person's quality of life.269 Denying a surveillance capa-
bility such as dialed digit extraction to law enforcement helps to ward off
references to "Big Brother" by limiting the power of government to access
private information. 270
A second impact concerns the questions U.S. Telecom leaves open,
namely the appropriate legal standards for obtaining location informa-
tion.271 U.S. Telecom stated that more than a pen register order is required
to obtain location information. 272 Thus the baseline is established; how-
ever, still open is the question as to what more than a pen register is
necessary. 273 During the 106th Congress, Representatives Bob Barr of
Georgia and JoAnn Emerson of Missouri proposed the Digital Privacy Act
264. The Fourth Amendment and the FBI's Carnivore Program, Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment] (statement of Jeffrey Rosen,
Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School).
265. John Schwartz, Court Says FCC Gives FBI Too Much Wiretap Power, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 16, 2000, atE-1; Eric Lichtblau, Privacy Advocates Win Ruling on
Wireless Devices Communications, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at A4.
266. Cf. Lester, supra note 257, at 27 (stating that Americans are more concerned about
privacy in the twenty-first century than they are about overpopulation, racial tensions, and global
warming).
267. ROSEN, supra note 108, at 25 (referring to how recent changes in technology have
helped to diminish privacy expectations once taken for granted).
268. Cf. Lichtblau, supra note 265 (referring to "Big Brother"); Lester, supra note 257 at 38
(noting the prevalence of "Big Brother" references). "Big Brother" is the fictional figurehead of
the post-democratic state of Oceania in George Orwell's classic novel about a world without
privacy and freedom. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
269. ROSEN, supra note 108, at 19. According to Rosen, "[flrom its earliest days, Jewish law
recognized that it is the uncertainty about whether or not we are being observed that forces us to
lead more constricted lives and inhibits us from speaking and acting freely in private places." Id.
270. Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying the
dialed digit capability to law enforcement and thus preventing "Big Brother" from "watching" the
numerical content of a telephone call).
271. Dempsey, supra note 207.
272. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 464.
273. Dempsey, supra note 207.
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of 2000 as a partial solution to the problem. 274 Their Digital Privacy Act
would require a judicial warrant based on probable cause before law
enforcement could engage in tracking cellular telephones, as they move
from cellular site to site.275 Normally the warrant could only be issued if
the suspect is thought to have committed or is committing a felony;
however, the Digital Privacy Act would also allow tracking of cellular
telephones without a warrant given the caller's permission. 276
A third impact concerns whether, in the future, Internet service provid-
ers (ISPs) will be subjected to CALEA-like assistance requirements for
Internet data packets.277 CALEA does not apply to information technolo-
gies such as the Internet and e-mail.278 While the ECPA allows searches of
Internet and e-mail communications, CALEA does not require ISP
assistance in conducting the search and seizure. 279 Therefore, there is a gap
between telecommunications carriers and ISPs.280
The FBI sought to jump the gap by creating a program called "Carni-
vore."281 Carnivore searches through the e-mail channeled through an ISP,
looking for messages that fit search criteria entered by a programmer. 282 In
the summer of 2000, the FBI issued a Carnivore disclosure with the ex-
pressed purpose of obtaining CALEA wiretap assistance from ISPs. 283 This
274. See H.R. 4987, 106th Cong. (2000) (resolving to enact six measures to increase digital
privacy).
275. Id.
276. Id. There are numerous reasons why a person might consent to having his or her
cellular telephone tracked; for example, tracking has helped to locate people caught in blizzards.
Senseney, supra note 168, at 667.
277. See infra text and accompanying notes 278-85.
278. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (1994) (excluding information services from the
CALEA assistance requirements); 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6) (1994) (defining information services).
According to CALEA:
The term "information services"-(A) means the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications; and (B) includes-(i) a ser-
vice that permits a customer to retrieve stored information from, or file information
for storage in, information storage facilities; (ii) electronic publishing; and (iii)
electronic messaging services.
Id. § 1001(6)(A) & (B).
279. The Tenth Amendment and the Internet, Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (attachment to testimony of Robert Corn-
Revere, Attorney, Hogag & Hartson L.L.P.)
280. Leahy, supra note 108.
281. Id.; see also Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, available at http://www.fbi.gov.programsl
carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Carnivore Diagnostic Tool].
282. Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by the FBI, Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
283. Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, supra note 281.
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is inconsistent with CALEA in that the assistance requirement does not ap-
ply to "information services," which are partially defined as "electronic
messaging." 284 This apparent FBI misuse of CALEA may require judicial
review; however, the events suggest that the FBI desires ISP assistance in
tapping Internet-based communication. 285
Any extension of wiretaps to the Internet and e-mail implicates an in-
teresting issue: whether Internet or e-mail data packets enjoy the same ex-
pectation of privacy as telephonic data packets.286 Some commentators
have already weighed in; for example, Jeffrey Rosen, an associate professor
of law at George Washington University Law School believes that obtain-
ing Internet addressing information is far more invasive than telephone call
identifying information. 28 7 A web address reveals content in ways that tele-
phone numbers do not because the design of a web address often suggests
something of the nature of the site.288 Further, unlike an unrecorded tele-
phone call, a LEA could log onto the Internet address obtained with a pen
register and see the content of the communication. 289 Therefore, the issue is
whether a mere pen register authorization is ever sufficient to access web
addresses.290
284. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(b)(2)(A) & 1001(6) (1994).
285. Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, supra note 281.
286. Fourth Amendment, supra note 264 (testimony of Jeffrey Rosen).
287. Id.
And yet the information revealed by Carnivore is far more invasive than the telephone
numbers revealed by a pen register. The government has access to the identity of the
recipient and sender of the specified communication, and, in the case of URL address-
es, to the search terms that may have been entered in an Internet search. By reviewing
the web sites a target has visited, the books he has skimmed, and the searches he has
entered, law enforcement agents may have access to a granular picture of his interests
and activities on line. In upholding the constitutionality of pen registers, the Supreme
Court reasoned that citizens have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information,
like telephone numbers, that they have voluntarily turned over to the phone company
and that they expect the phone copy to record. But it is hardly clear that citizens feel
similarly about records of their Internet searches and reading habits.
Id.
288. Id. For example, via a pen register, law enforcement could determine that a call to
(701) 777-2941 went to the Law Review office at the University of North Dakota School of Law;
but nothing of the call's content would be apparent from the number alone. Cf. Id. On the other
hand; a LEA armed with a pen register would discover an Internet user visited http://www.law.
und.nodak.edu/grades/; from this information, the LEA would know something of the content of
the communication, that grades from the University of North Dakota School of Law were
accessed. Cf. Id. Further, given current difficulties with data separation, if the data packet
included the password to access the actual grades, an unscrupulous law enforcement agent could
access even more communication content. Cf. Id.
289. Cf. Id. This will result in litigation asking whether viewing a web address obtained with
a pen register is like a plain view observation and whether cyberspace is outside protected
curtilage. Cf. Dempsey, supra note 207 (anticipating future litigation).
290. Dempsey, supra note 207.
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B. NORTH DAKOTA IMPACT
Wiretaps in North Dakota are authorized by the North Dakota Century
Code, and the requisite elements to obtain court authorization read much
like the Title III requirements.291 For example, the application must be in
writing, based on probable cause, normal techniques must be tried, and all
previous applications must be identified.292 Further, telecommunication
carriers are required to assist law enforcement in court-authorized wire-
taps.293 In North Dakota, the definition of communications subject to
tapping already implicitly includes cellular technologies. 294 It follows, in
these respects, the U.S. Telecom decision will not provide North Dakota law
enforcement any capabilities beyond what they have under state law.295
However, North Dakota law, in another sense, may be inconsistent
with CALEA.296 North Dakota allows wiretapping of wire, electronic, or
oral communications.2 97 The statutory definition of electronic communica-
291. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-02 (1991). The relevant portion of the statute reads:
Each application for wiretapping or eavesdropping ... must include:
The identity of the law enforcement officer.
A complete statement of the facts and circumstances... justify[ing] the belief that
an order should be issued.
A complete statement as to whether other investigative procedures have been tried
and failed, or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed.
A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be
maintained.
A complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications.
Id. § 29-29.2-02(3).
292. Id.
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-03 (1991). The North Dakota provision reads:
An order authorizing the interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication
must, upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier shall
furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that the carrier is according the person whose communi-
cations are to be intercepted. A communication common carrier furnishing these facili-
ties or technical assistance must be compensated by the applicant for reasonable
expenses incurred in providing the facilities or assistance.
Id.
294. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-03 (allowing interception of "electronic com-
munication") with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2.-01(4) (1991) (defining ."[ellectronic communi-
cation' [as a] transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical
system").
295. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (listing requirements for a Title
III warrant to tap communication devices) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-02 (listing similar
North Dakota requirements). Compare 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring
industry assistance) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-03 (requiring industry assistance).
296. See infra text accompanying notes 297-98.
297. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-02. The statute refers to "wiretapping" and "eaves-
dropping;" however, these terms are not defined. Id; N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-01 (providing
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tion implicitly includes cellular technologies; however, the statute excludes
tracking devices.298 Although the U.S. Telecom court did not consider
antenna location information to be a tracking capability, Congress has con-
sidered allowing real-time tracking of cellular telephones, given a Title III
warrant.299 Therefore, two. issues will develop in North Dakota law. 300
First, whether the definition of electronic communication excludes cellular
telephones if they are used as tracking devices. 301 Second, whether cellular
telephones can be wiretapped if excluded from the definition of electronic
communication. 302 Legislative or judicial consideration will be required if
the antenna location capability in CALEA or developing cellular tech-
nologies weigh in favor of defining cellular telephones as tracking
devices. 303
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. Telecom involved the first review of legislation dealing with
wiretaps of digital telephone technology. 304 The court concluded that dialed
digit extraction exacts too great a privacy cost, but that antenna location in-
formation as well as packet-mode data might be acceptable. 305 However,
the court left the door open to future decisions regarding the requisite legal
standard for obtaining antenna location information and packet-mode
data.306
Notably, as a direct result of the September 11 th attack, Congress is
again looking at the wiretap law.307 Like with CALEA in 1994, the Justice
definitions). The defined term most like "wiretapping" and "eavesdropping" is "intercept" which
refers to wire, electronic, and oral communications. Id. § 29-29.2-01(6). Additionally, the statute
authorizing "wiretapping" and "eavesdropping" uses the wire, electronic, and oral language
elsewhere. Id. § 29-29.2-02(5)(d), (7), (9), (11), (12), (14)-(19). Therefore, the closest approxi-
mation, from the statutory language of what the legislature intended to be subject to wiretapping,
is wire, electronic, and oral communications. Id. §§ 29-29.2-01 & 29-29.2-02.
298. Id. § 29-29.2-01(4).
299. H.R. 4987, 106th Cong. (2000).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 296-98.
301. Compare H.R. 4987, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing limited use of cellular telephones
as tracking devices) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-01 (excluding tracking devices from the
definition of electronic communication).
302. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-01 (excluding tracking devices from the definition of
electronic communication).
303. See supra text accompanying note 298.
304. U.S. Telecom v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
305. U.S. Telecom, 227 F.3d at 463-65.
306. Id. at 464-65.
307. See H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001) (suggesting amendments to the wiretap laws as a
means to counter terrorism).
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Department is leading the charge for greater capabilities. 308 The House of
Representatives has gone so far as to title its provision PATRIOT (Provide
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism). 309 Since
PATRIOT concerns amendments to the warrant requirement under Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and not the
industry assistance requirement found in CALEA, the law reviewed here is
not fundamentally affected.310 The law at issue is still binding, and
American history teaches that concerns for liberty and privacy are always
with us, even if more dormant in times of crisis than in times of peace and
prosperity. 311
Jason Broberg
308. Jesse J. Holland, Senate, Bush Aides OK Anti-Terrorism Package, CHI. TRIB., October
4, 2001, at 9N.
309. H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001).
310. Id.
311. Cf. generally, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (legitimating the
exclusion and internment without trial of Japanese-Americans during World War II as a valid
exercise of Congress' war power).
2001]

